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THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF LEGAL
COMPLAINTS
Abstract: In 2002, a renowned U.S. class action law firm began placing
copyright notices on its legal complaints. Cease-and-desist letters have
been filed against several firms that lifted language off of the copyrighted
complaints. Although no litigation has ensued to determine whether
legal complaints are copyrightable, this Note asserts that legal complaints
are copyrightable subject matter under the Copyright Act of 1976 despite
the limitations of the idea-expression dichotomy, merger doctrine, useful
article doctrine, and fair use defense. This Note focuses on the originality
requirement of the Copyright Act, as interpreted through U.S. case law,
and contends that legal complaints exhibit sufficient originality to
warrant copyright protection.
There appear to be no valid grounds why legal forms such as contracts, in-
surance policies, pleadings and other legal documents should not be pro-
tected under the law of copyright.'
INTRODUCTION
The copyrightability of legal complaints is a new and intriguing
issue affecting American copyright jurisprudence. 2 In 2002, the re-
nowned class action law firm of Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes &
Lerach LLP placed copyright notices on its complaints and registered
those complaints with the U.S. Copyright Office. 3 The firm is attempt-
ing to prevent. other law firms from lifting language off of its com-
plaints, and the firm's counsel has already issued cease-and-desist let,
ters to ten firms who have plagiarized Milberg Weiss's complaints. 4
This Note analyzes the copyrightability of a legal complaint and con-
cludes that. Milberg Weiss would prevail in enforcing its copyright of
its legal complaints. 5
1 MELviLLE B. NIMMFR & DAVID NEWSIER, NINIMER ON COPVRIGIEE§ 2.181E) (2003).
2 See Stanley F. Birch, Copyright Aviation for Attorney Woth Product: Practical and Ethical Con-
siderations, 10 J. INITIAL. Prtto. L. 255, 256 (2003); Janet L. Conley, Milberg Miss Ties to Nail
Class Action Imitators, http://www.law.comnsp/articlejsp?id=10366304581 ,15
 (Nov. 20. 2002),
s See Conley, supra note 2. It is not necessary to register works to obtain copyright pro-
tection, nor is it necessary to affix a copyright notice, although taking these actions makes
additional remedies available. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 408 (2000).
4 See Conley, supra note 2.
6 See infra notes 214-317 and accompanying text.
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The situation, on its face, is not complicated.6 A law firm, Firm X,
spends countless hours researching and compiling facts for a nation-
wide class action lawsuit.? Firm X drafts a complaint, which includes a
copyright notice, but along comes a competing firm, Firm Y, that files
an identical complaint against the same defendants Rather than re-
peat the strenuous work of Firm X, however, Firm Y simply usurps
Firm X's complaint by copying and filing the exact same complaint.9
Firm X upon learning of Firm F's copying, files cease-and-desist letters,
and eventually files a copyright infringement lawsuit against Firm KR)
Article I of the U.S. Constitution provides copyright protection to
authors and inventors by giving them the exclusive Might to their
respective Mritings and [d]iscoveries" in order "No promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts."" With this power, Congress
adopted the Copyright Act of 1976, which protects "original works of
authorship," including literary works; musical works; dramatic works;
pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and sculp-
tural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound re-
cordings; and architectural works. 12
6 See infra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
7 See Birch, supra note 2, at 257.
a See Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley, supra note 2.
!7
	 Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley, supra note 2.
Sce Con ley, supra note 2.
ti U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12 17 U.S.C.§ 102(a) (2000). The Copyright Act sets forth that
(a) Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known
or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise conununicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.
Works of authorship include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works. including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic. and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system. method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.
Id. § IO2(a)—(b).
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Litigation between Milberg Weiss, Firm X in the hypothetical,
and alleged infringing firms, like Firm Y, has yet to materialize." The
difficulty courts will have in evaluating this type of copyright in-
fringement claim, however, is apparent due to the requirements of
the Copyright Act. of 1976." This Note predicts the outcome of a po-
tential copyright. infringement suit by Firm X against an allegedly in-
fringing law firm, Firm Y, by examining case law in U.S. copyright ju-
risprudence." Section LA of this Note briefly introduces the overall
structure of copyright law, including the requirements for copy-
rightability, as well as the rights that a copyright owner possesses
against infringers." Next, section I.B focuses on copyrightable subject
matter, which is the first hurdle that Firm X must overcome to enforce
its copyright against Firm Y.I 7 This section details the originality re-
quirement of copyright law through seminal judicial decisions."
Section I.0 sets forth the various limitations on comightability,
which are applicable even if complaints are copyrightable, including
the idea-expression dichotomy, merger doctrine, useful article doc-
trine, and fair use defense.I° Thus, section I.0 sets forth the potential
defenses Firm Y would have against Firm X's copyright infringement
suit.20 Finally, Part II applies each of the various subject matter-related
copyright doctrines to the copyrightability of complaints and concludes
that Firm X's complaint is copyrightable subject matter, and Firm X
likely would prevail in a copyright infringement suit against Firm Y. 2I
1. ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHT
A. Copyright Act of 1976
Under the Copyright Act of 1976, a protectable work must, be of
copyrightable subject matter. 22 That is, a copyrightable work must ex-
hibit originality and be fixed in a "tangible medium of expression."23 In
15 See Conley, supra note 2.
14 See 17 U.S.C. § 102; Birch, supra note 2, at 258; Conley, supra note 2.
15 See infra notes 22-317 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
17 Sec infra notes 31-87 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 31-87 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 88-213 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 88-213 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 214-317 and accompanying text.
22 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
25 Id. This Note assumes that a legal complaint satisfies the requirement of being
"fixed in any tangible medium of expression" because it "can be perceived, reproduced, or
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addition, the Act sets out various notice and registration options for
copyright owners.24
 Finally; a copyright lasts for the life of the author
plus 70 years or, in the case of entity authors, 95 years from first publi-
cation or 120 years from the year of creation, whichever occurs first. 25
To establish copyright infringement successfully, a copyright
owner must prove that there is valid ownership of a copyright and that
the defendant copied and improperly appropriated the copyright
owner's work. 25
 A defendant may also infringe a plaintiff's copyright by
other means, such as creating a derivative work without prior permis-
sion." In addition, a copyright owner also has reproduction, distribu-
tion, performance, and display rights on the original work so that a
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." See id.;
H.R. Rev. No. 94-1476, at 51-52 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5664-65. Civil proce-
dure rules also require parties to file their complaints, pleadings, and papers formally with
the clerk of court. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 5(e); MASS. R. Cm R 5(d)-(g); TEX. R. Cw. P. 74.
24 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412. The Copyright Act sets out explicit "Notice of Copyright"
requirements for visually perceptible copies, phonorecords of sound recordings, publica-
tions incorporating U.S. government works, and contributions to collective works. Id.
§§ 401-404. Sections 408 through 412 set out the requirements for copyright registration.
Id. §§ 408-412.
25 Id. § 302.
26
 See, e.g., N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1992);
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.
1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir. 1976); Universal
Athletic Sales Co..v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 907 (3d Cir. 1975). This Note, by assuming that
Firm Y copies the entirety of Firm X's complaint, focuses only on the copyrightability of
legal complaints and reserves the analyses of copyright infringement and misappropria-
tion for future discourse. See infra notes 31-317 and accompanying text.
27 See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2); Anderson v. Stallone, No. 87-0592, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11109, at 4'23-24 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989); Paul Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative
Worirs in Copyright, 30J. Copviticirr Soc'v 209, 210 (1983). A copyright owner has the ex-
clusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works. pan-
tomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pan-
tomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly
by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C.§ 106.
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defendant is liable for infringement for reproducing, distributing, per-
forming, or displaying a work without authorization from the owner. 28
The following Section clarifies one of the principle requirements of
copyrightability—the originality requirement—as developed through
case law.29 Subsequent sections addtess the limitations to copyright, such
as the idea-expression dichotomy, merger doctrine, useful article doc-
trine, and fair use defense."
B. Copyrightable Subject Matter—atinality
Section 102 of the Copyright Act states that "protection subsists
.. in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated ...." 31 Accord-
ingly, in the hypothetical example of Firm X's copyrighted complaint,
Firm X first will need to persuade a court that its complaint is within
the realm of copyrightable subject matter because it is "original." 32
This requirement does not demand novelty, as is required in patent
law, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit." In fact, all that is required of this
low originality standard is a showing that an author independently
created a work that features a modicum of creativity. 34 Thus, Firm Y
may copyright a complaint even if it is identical to a prior, copyrighted
work, such as Firm X's complaint, so long as Firm Y shows that it in-
dependently created the work and that it features sufficient. creativ-
ity." The meaning of independent creation and originality is de-
scribed in the following subsections."
26 Sec 17 U.S.C. § 106.
29 See infra notes 31-87 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 88-213 and accompanying text.
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
32 See id; Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 363-64 (1991);
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239. 250 (1903); Burrow-Giles Litho-
graphic Co. v. Saxony, 111 U.S. 53, 60 (1884); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus.
Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2d Cir. 1999).
33 See H.R. REP. No. 94.1476, at 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5664.
34 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Ryan Littrell, Toward a Stricter Originality Standard for Copy-
right Law. 43 B.C. L. REV. 193, 193-94 (2001),
33
 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 345; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Burrow-Giles, 111  U.S. at 60; Nihon
Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70-71.
36 See infra notes 37-87 and accompanying text.
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1. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony: An Author's Creative Efforts
Contribute to a Work's Originality
In 1884, in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, the U.S. Su-
preme Court addressed the originality standard as applied to a pho-
tograph of Oscar Wilde and concluded that the photograph was
sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection. 37 In Burrow-Giles,
the plaintiff produced a photograph of Oscar Wilde in which the
plaintiff posed and arranged the subject, selected his costume, and
adjusted the lighting. 38 Subsequently, the defendant made and sold
copies of the photograph, but argued that he could not have in-•
fringed on any copyright because photographs were not "writings" as
is required by the Constitution. 39 The Court, however, interpreted the
Constitution's language to encompass "all forms of writing, printing,
engraving, etching, &c., by which the ideas in the mind of the author
are given visible expression." 4° In essence, the Court defined "author"
to mean "he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker," so
that copyright focuses on the originality of expression—not the mode
of expression, such as a photograph. 41
In Burrow-Giles, the Court recognized that photographs are not
copyrightable per se, but held that the plaintiff's photograph was pro-
tected because it exhibited the requisite originality. 42 The Court exam-
ined the plaintiff's creative efforts in making the photograph, which
included posing the subject in a particular way, choosing an appropri-
ate costume and accessories, and applying different light and shade. 43
Accordingly, the Court held that the photograph was an original work
of authorship because it arose from the plaintiff's own original mental
conception and displayed the requisite modicum of creativity."
2. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.: Originality Does Not
Depend on Aesthetic Merit
Moreover, in 1903, in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., the
U.S. Supreme Court again addressed the originality requirement in
]7 I l l U.S. at 54-55, 60.
38 Id. at 55-56.
"Id. at 56.
4° Id. at 58.
41 See id. at 57-58.
42 See 111 U.S. at 59-60.
43 Id. at 60.
44 Id. at 55, 60.
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copyright. law and held that originality does not depend on a work's
aesthetic merit.45 In Bleistein, the plaintiff's employees created three
chromolithographs—pictures printed in colors from a series of litho-
graphic stones or plates—depicting various circus scenes. 40 The de-
fendant was accused of copying the three chromolithographs in viola-
tion of the plaintiff's copyright.47 The posters were designed for sale
to a circus owner to use in advertising his circus. 48 The posters de-
picted different circus scenes—one of an ordinary ballet, another of
bicycle performers, and one of nien and women costumed to repre-
sent. statues.49 As additional proof that the posters were original and
were not made for anyone else, each poster also included pictures of
the circus owner. 50
The Court referenced its holding in Burrow-Giles in stating that
lithographs were not automatically barred from copyright protection
due to their mechanical nature." The Court also rejected the notion
that originality should be decided by judging the aesthetic merits of a
work.52 Instead, the Court, in holding that the lithographs were origi-
nal, relied on a personality theory of copyright, which states that a
work is original because it encompasses the unique personality of its
artist. 55 The lithographs in Bleistein, like the photograph of Oscar
Wilde in Burrow-Giles, were sufficiently original because they con-
tained the artists' personal imprint of creativity and uniqueness."
Specifically, the posters were original designs that arose from the art-
ists' ideal of how to appeal to an audience's imagination. 55 Like in
Burrow-Giles, the artists' creative judgments about the arrangement
and selection of pictures were their original creation. 56
45 188 U.S. at 251-52.
46
 ./d. at 248.
47 Id.
45 Id.
49 Id.
55
 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 248.
51 Id. at 249.
52 Id. at 251-52.
53 Id. at 250.
54 See id.
55 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251,252.
66
 See id.
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3. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Co.: Factual
Compilations Are Copyrightable If They Exhibit Sufficient
Originality
In addition to the artistic works of photographs and posters in
Burrow-Giles and Bleistein, respectively, the originality requirement also
applies to literary works, such as telephone directories and news re-
ports.57 In 1991, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Co.,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the names and telephone numbers
used in the plaintiffs telephone directory were not sufficiently origi-
nal to warrant copyright protection. 58 In Feist, the plaintiff, Rural
Telephone Service Company; published a typical telephone directory
that listed the names of its subscribers in alphabetical order along
with each subscriber's telephone number and town. 59 The defendant,
Feist Publications, Inc., also published telephone directories. 60 Unlike
the plaintiff's directory, however, the defendant published area-wide
directories that spanned larger geographical ranges. 61
In Feist, the defendant wanted to compile a directory that covered
eleven different telephone service areas. 62 Accordingly, the defendant
approached each of the eleven local telephone companies to obtain
subscriber information." The plaintiff was the only service provider
that refused to license its listings to the defendant." Nevertheless, the
defendant used the plaintiffs directory without consent, and the
plaintiff sued for copyright infringement. 65
In holding for the defendant, the Court reiterated the impor-
tance of two well-established propositions in copyright. jurispru-
dence.66 First, facts are not. copyrightable because they do not owe
their origin to the author; second, compilations of facts generally are
copyrightable.67 In addition, an important limitation on the copy-
rightability of compilations is that protection will extend only to the
element of the compilation that is, in fact, copyrightable—the creative
97 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 363-64; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70.
99 499 U.S. at 363-64.
69 Id. at 342.
60 Id.
61 Id. at
62 Id.
65 Feist,
64 Id.
65 Id, at
66 Id. at
67 Id. at
343.
499 U.S. at 343.
343-44.
344.
344, 347; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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arrangement." In Feist, the plaintiff's telephone directory was com-
posed of uncopyrightable, factual information—names of subscribers
and their corresponding towns and telephone numbers." The Court
stated that "[t] he sine qua. non of copyright is originality," as mandated
by the Copyright Act, because a work must be original to the author
before it. will qualify for protection." The level of creativity demanded
by the originality requirement is extremely low, but here, the telephone
directory was not even minimally creative. 7 i The names and telephone
numbers of the subscribers were not created independently by the
plaintiff, and therefore, could not be protected under copyTight. 72
The plaintiff, however, argued that its directory was still pro-
tected because it was a factual compilation." The Court recognized
this exception, noting that a factual compilation may meet the mini-
mum constitutional requirement for copyright protection if it features
an original selection or arrangement—in essence, if it possesses a
modicum of creativity. 74 In Feist, however, the plaintiff did not select,
coordinate, or arrange the factual information in an original way." In
fact, the plaintiff's selection and arrangement was typical of any tele-
phone directory, and there was nothing remotely creative about orga-
nizing the directory alphabetically by surname."
The Court reiterated that the primary objective of copyright law
is "No promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts"—not to re-
ward the labor, or "sweat of the brow," of authors. 77 In conclusion, the
Court held that the names, towns, and telephone numbers in the
plaintiff's telephone directory, as well as the organization of the in-
formation, lacked sufficient originality; and therefore, the defendant
did not copy protectable subject matter."
Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
DD Id. at 342.
7D Id. at 345.
71 Id, at 345, 363.
72 Id.
73 Feist, 499 U.S. at 348.
74 Sec id.
75 Id. at. 362-63.
76
	see also BellSouth Adver. & Publ'g Corp. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, Inc., 999 F.2d
1436, 1444 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a yellow pages business directory arrangement
was not sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection because the heading titles,
such as "Attorneys" and "Banks," were typical and obvious labels for the categories).
77 Feist. 499 U.S. at 349, 354; sec U.S. CONS'''. art. I, § 8, el. 8.
78 Feist, 499 U.S. at 363-64.
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4. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc.: Copyright
Protection Extends to an Author's Analysis and Manner of
Expression
More recently, in 1998, in Nihon. Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline
Business Data, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that news
reports were copyrightable because they contained sufficient original-
ity." In Nihon Keizai, the plaintiff, a Japanese corporation that pub-
lished financial and business news, accused the defendants of copy-
right infringement for translating portions of twenty-two of the
plaintiffs news articles to sell as abstracts to customers.8° The defen-
dants' abstracts displayed the same structure, organization, and
grouping of facts as the plaintiffs news reports. 81 In addition, the de-
fendants' abstracts produced the same conclusions as the plaintiffs
reports, often using identical phrases and word choices. 82 Basically,
the defendants' abstracts were nearly word-for-word translations of the
plaintiff's original reports, with only occasional rearrangements of
facts or deviations from the plaintiff's sentence structure es
In addressing the main issue of whether the defendants' work was
substantially similar to the plaintiff's work to constitute unlawful copy-
ing, the court first acknowledged that the defendants' abstracts re-
ported unprotected factual information. 84 Nevertheless, the court
held that the defendant violated the plaintiffs copyright in its news
reports, because copyright protects "the manner of expression, the
author's analysis or interpretation of events, the way he structures his
material and marshals facts, his choice of words, and the emphasis he
gives to particular developments." 85 Essentially, even though the news
is not copyrightable in itself due to its highly factual substance, there
may be a copyright in the reporter's or publisher's expression of the
facts.86 The plaintiffs arrangement of facts, word choice, sentence
structure, and analysis were all part of the plaintiffs protectable ex-
79 See 1661~.3d at 70.
aa Sec id. at 69, 70.
81 Id, at 70-71.
82 Id,
83 Id. at 71.
84 Nihon Keizai, 166 F.Sd at 70.
ea Id. (quoting Wainwright Sec. Inc. v. Wall Si. Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91, 95-96 (2d
Cir. 1977)).
88 See id.
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pression, and therefore, the defendants violated the plaintiff's copy-
right in the reports by copying the original and protectable elements. 87
C. Limitations and Defenses Against Copyright Protection.
Various doctrines emanate from the rules set out in the Copy-
right Act that limit the extent of copyright protection of a work, in-
cluding the idea-expression dichotomy, merger doctrine, useful arti-
cle doctrine, and fair use defense. 88 The idea-expression dichotomy
stands for the proposition that only expression—as opposed to
ideas—is protectable under copyright law. 89 The difficulty in applying
this rule, as illustrated in the cases discussed below, is in distinguish-
ing between ideas and expression." As a branch of the idea-
expression dichotomy, the merger doctrine stales that when there are
only a limited number of ways to express an idea, the scarce expres-
sions are "merged," and are considered inseparable from the idea it-
87 Sca ed. The court offered two exceptions to its holding, which are inconsequential to
this Note because the exceptions relate to copyright infringement and misappropriation
when only portions of a work are copied—as opposed to Finn V. which copies the entirety
of Firm X's complaint. See id. at 71. In the first exception, one of the defendants' abstracts
did not copy the plaintiff's protectable expression, because the only similarity between it
and the plaintiffs corresponding report was the use of the same facts. Id. The defendant
reported the facts in a different arrangement using different sentence structure and word
choice. Id. Because the abstract only repeated uncopyrightable facts, as opposed to repeat-
ing the plaintiff's protected expression, there was no copyright infringement regarding
this particular abstract. Id.
The second exception resulted from the defendants' copying of only one paragraph
of the plaintiffs six-paragraph article. Id As opposed to the other infringing abstracts,
which copied well over fifty percent of the plaintiff's respective reports, this particular
abstract only copied twenty percent of the plaintiff's original report. Id. The court was
careful not to establish a quantitative bright-line rule that twenty percent copying is never
substantially similar for infringement purposes. Id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 564-65 (1985) (holding that copying of an insubstantial
portion of a book still qualified as copyright infringement when the defendant essentially
copied the "heart of the book"). The court made it clear that infringement would depend
on both a quantitative—how much was copied—and qualitative—what was copied—analy-
sis. See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 71. Where, as in the case at hand, the copyrighted work
contained both uncopyrightable facts and copyrightable expression, a higher quantity of
copying was required to support an infringement claim. Id. In contrast, if the work were
wholly original, a lower quantity of copying would justify a finding of infringement. Id.
an Sec Hamper ce Row, 471 U.S. at 560, 569; Baker V. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-05 (1879);
Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 72-73; Brandir Intl, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d
1142, 1143 (2d Cir. 1987); Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970, 973 (6th Cir.
1983); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967); Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
88 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 104-05; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
91' See Baker, 101 U.S. at 104-05; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121; infra notes 96-117 and accom-
panying text.
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self, thereby making the expression of the idea unprotectable under
copyright law. 9 ' Next, the useful article doctrine holds that a work is
uncopyrightable if it is used for solely utilitarian purposes. 92 The
difficulty here, similar to the idea-expression dichotomy, is determin-
ing when a work is primarily functional instead of aesthetically moti-
vated.93
 Finally, the fair use defense utilizes a four-factor balancing test
to determine when to allow unauthorized copying of a copyrighted
work.91
 The following subsections describe these various limitations
and defenses and how they affect the copyrightability of subject mat-
ter ordinarily viewed as protectable under the Copyright Act. 95
1. Idea-Expression Dichotomy
The Copyright Act expressly sets forth that copyright protection
does not extend to "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of
operation, concept, principle, or discovery."" This rule, the idea-
expression dichotomy, means that ideas, as opposed to expression, are
not coppightable.97 In terms of the hypothetical example in the In-
troduction to this Note, Firm X is tillable to copyright its complaint if
it encompasses an idea rather than a form of expression 98
 The
difficulty in this inquiry, however, is in determining the line between
idea and expression."
a. Baker v. Selden: Copyright Protection Extends to the Explanation of an
Art, But Not to The Art Itself
In 1879, in Baker v. Selden, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth die
critical idea-expression dichotomy by denying copyright protection to
'a system of bookkeeping.'" In Baket; the plaintiff, Charles Selden, ob-
St See Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678-79; infra notes 118-130 and accompanying text.
92 See BnIndir, 834 F.2d at 1147; Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973; infra notes 131-171 and ac-
companying text.
See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147; Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973; infra notes 131-171 and ac-
companying text.
94
 Sec Harper Eq' Row, 471 U.S. at 560-61; Nihon Itithai, 166 F.3d at 72; infra notes 172-
213 and accompanying text.
96 See infra notes 96-213 and accompanying text.
96 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
97 See id.; Baker; 101 U.S. at 104-05; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
98 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 104-05; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
99 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 104-05; Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
10 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 107. Although the U.S. Supreme Court did not explicitly use
the term "idea-expression dichotomy" in Baker, it formally set forth the doctrine in its 1954
decision in Mazer a. Stein. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,217 (1954). In Mazer, the Court
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tamed a copyright for a book entitled "Selden's Condensed Ledger, or
Book-keeping Simplified" in which he explained a particular book-
keeping system and illustrated his method with blank forms contain-
ing ruled lines, blank columns, and headings." The defendant, the
alleged infringer, also wished to explain a bookkeeping system by us-
ing illustrative forms, but he used a different arrangement of columns
and headings. 162 The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant for al-
legedly infringing the plaintiffs copyright by copying his bookkeep-
ing forms. 103
The U.S. Supreme Court held that the explanatory nature of the
plaintiffs book was copyrightable, because the author explained
bookkeeping in his own, particular way.'" Nevertheless, the Court
held for the defendant because he did not copy the plaintiff's expla-
nation of the bookkeeping system. 1 °5 Instead, the copyright infringe-
ment claim rested solely on the defendant's copying of the blank
forms used to illustrate the bookkeeping practice. 1 D6
The Court, in holding that there was no valid copyright on the
forms in the book, emphasized the distinction between an author's
expression and the idea that is the subject of the author's expres-
sion. 107 The Court stated that the use of an art is "totally different ...
from a publication of the book explaining" the art."18 The plaintiffs
explanation of bookkeeping was protectable as expression, but. the
forms he used corresponded with the art of bookkeeping, which was
reiterated the importance of the idea-expression dichotomy by stating that "encourage-
ment of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare
through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.'" Id, at 219. Es-
sentially. the Court in Mazer looked to preserve the balance between competition and pro-
tection to determine how best to encourage the individual efforts of artists. Sec id. Mazer
involved table lamps made in the shapes of male and female dancing figures. Id, at 202.
The Court held that the lamps were copyrightable subject matter despite the fact that the
lamps' bases—the male and female figures—were put to practical use. Id. at 217,218. The
Court noted that copyright protection is "given only to the expression of the idea—not the
idea itself" and expressly acknowledged the idea-expression dichotomy from Baker. Id, at
217; see also CDN Inc. v. Kapes. 197 F.3d 1256,1262 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that copyright
protection for the plaintiff's price guides served as an incentive to create such price guides
and fostered competition for others to create their own price guides).
101 Baker, 101 U.S. at 99-100.
102 Id. at 100.
1°3 Id.
104 Id. at 101-02,105.
1 °5 Id. at 101,104.
Baker; 101 U.S. at 100.
107 Id. at 102,104-05.
108 Id. at 104.
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not protectable tinder copyright. 109 Implicitly, the forms lacked the
requisite modicum of originality to support copyrightability, and
therefore, the plaintiff did not have an exclusive right to make and to
use the blank account forms in his book."°
b. Nichols V. Universal Pictures Corp.: Using the Abstractions Test to Dis-
tinguish Ideas from Expression.
Although courts often have found it difficult to distinguish ideas
from expression, Judge Learned Hand, in his oft-cited 1930 opinion
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Nichols v. Universal Pictures .
Cotp., offered a solution commonly referred to as the "abstractions
test." The defendant in Nichols was accused of copying the plaintiff's
play, "Abie's Irish Rose." 1 E 2 The plots of both the plaintiffs and de-
fendant's plays involved lovers, torn by their families' animosities to-
wards one another, who married, bore children, and helped reconcile
their families' differences. 1 l 3
In deciding whether the defendant had copied the plaintiff's
play, Judge Hand noted that "Ltd pon any work ... a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out." 114 For instance, the most general
statement of the play may have stated simply what the play was
about. 115
 There is a point in this series of abstractions, however, where
the pattern is no longer protected because doing so would protect
general ideas instead of an author's expression." 6 In essence, the
plays in Nichols were copyrightable, but the underlying theme com-
mon to both plays—lovers who reconcile their families' differences—
was too general to be copyrightable. 117
I " Id. at 104, 107.
II° See id. at 107.
"' Sec 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
" 2 Id, at 120.
113 Id. at 122. As Judge Hand noted, "The only matter common to the two is a quarrel
between a Jewish and an Irish father, the marriage of their children, the birth of grand-
children and a reconciliation." Id.
'" Id. at 121.
" 5 Id.
II° Sec Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121.
" 7 See id. at 122. Judge Hand stated that the plaintiff's general idea of "conflicts be-
tween Irish and Jews, into which the marriage of their children enters" was no more copy-
rightable than the "outline of Romeo and Juliet." Id.
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2. Merger Doctrine
The merger doctrine is an extension of the basic rationale of the
idea-expression dichotomy, because it limits the copyrightability of
expression when there is only one or a few, limited ways to express an
idea." 8 In such instances, the idea of the work and the expression be-
hind the work merge together, that is, become inseparable, and as a
merged component, become unprotectable under copyright law,"°
With respect to the hypothetical example in this Note, Firm X would
be tillable to copyright its complaint if there were only a limited
number of ways to express the complaint's content. 120 Copyright pro-
tection would be denied because it would essentially allow Firm X to
constrain the public, that is, other law firms, from future use of the
complaint's substance."' If there were numerous ways to express the
complaint's content, however, then Firm X could attain copyright pro-
tection in its complaint because, with other ways to express the con-
tent, Firm Ywould not have to rely on Firm X's expression. 122 The fol-
lowing case illustrates the application of the merger doctrine. 123 .
a. Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co.: Merger Applies When There Are
Only a Limited Number of Ways to Express an Idea
In 1967, in Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., the First Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's "Rule 1" set forth in a sales
contest was not copyrightable because there were only a limited num-
ber of ways to express the rule. 124 The plaintiff was the copyright
118 See Morrissey, 379 F.2d at. 678-79.
119 See id.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See infra notes 124-130 and accompany text.
124 Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678-79. Plaintiff's "Rule 1" stated,
1. Entrants should print name, address and social security number on a box-
top, or a plain paper. Entries must be accompanied by boxiop or by plain
paper on which the name ... is copied front any source. Official rules are ex-
plained on ... packages of leaflets obtained from dealer. If you do not have a
social security number you may use the name and number of any member of
your inunediate family living with you. Only the person named on the entry
will be deemed an entrant and may qualify for price.
Use the correct social security number belonging to the person named on
entry ... wrong number will be disqualified.
Id. at 678. Defendant's Rtde l stated:
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owner of a set of rules for a traditional sweepstakes-type contest. 125
The plaintiff stied the defendant, who was also engaged in a similar-
type contest, for copying nearly all of "Rule 1," which included in-
structions for entering the contest. 126 Although there was proof that
there was more than one way of stating the rule, the court ruled in
favor of the defendant because the subject matter was too narrow to
qualify' for copyright protection. 127
Essentially, when there are only a limited number of ways to ex-
press a certain subject matter, copyrighting the "mere handful" of ex-
pressions could constrain the public by exhausting all possibilities for
future use. 128
 "Rule 1" could only be expressed in a limited number of
ways because it was so straightforward and simple."9 In such circum-
stances, the expression merges with the underlying idea, and copy-
right does not extend to the subject matter at all.' 34
3. Useful Article Doctrine
In addition to the idea-expression dichotomy and merger doc-
trine, the useful article doctrine provides another limitation on copy-
right protection, 131
 The Copyright Act of 1976 extends protection to
1. Entrants should print name, address and Social Security number on a Tide
boxtop, or on la] plain paper. Entries must be accompanied by Tide boxtop
(any size) or by plain paper on which the name 'Tide" is copied from any
source. Official rules are available on Tide Sweepstakes packages, or on
leaflets at Tide dealers, or you can send a stamped, self-addressed envelope
to: Tide ''Shopping Fling" Sweepstakes, P.O. Box 4459, Chicago 77, Illinois.
If you do not have a Social Security number, you may use the name and
number of any member of your inunediate family living with you. Only the per-
son named on the entry will be deemed an entrant and may qualify for a prize.
Use the correct Social Security number, belonging to the person named
on the entry—wrong munbers will be disqualified.
Id.
125 Id. at 676.
126 Id.
121
 Id. at 678.
128 Id. at 678-79.
129 See Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678-79.
159 See id.; BellSouth. 999 F.2d at 1442 (holding that because there were only a few ways
to construct a useful business directory, the arrangement of the directory—the expression
of the information--"merged" with the idea of a business directory and was uncopyright-
able); el Kregos v. Associated Press, 3 F.3d 656, 660 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the plain-
tiff's pitching forms, used to predict winners in upcoming baseball games by comparing
pitchers' statistics, did not evince a merger of idea and expression because there were nu-
merous ways to express the idea of rating pitchers' performances).
131 See 17 U .S.C.§ 101 (2000); Brandin 834 F.2d at 1143; Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973.
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"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works." 132 Protection for such
works, however, is limited by the useful article doctrine, which prohib-
its protection of works that serve a utilitarian function.'" The Copy-
right Act defines a "useful article" as an "article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article or to convey information: 134 In adopting the useful article
doctrine, Congress's intent was "to draw as clear a line as possible be-
tween copyrightable works of applied art and uncopyrighted works of
industrial design" to avoid monopolization of functional works.' Re-
lating back to the hypothetical introduced in this Note, Firm X's
complaint might not be copyright protected due to its utilitarian
function in the judicial process. 136 As discussed in the cases below, if
one is unable to separate the artistic elements of Firm Ks complaint
frOm its functional aspects, then the complaint itself is solely utilitar-
ian and unprotectable under copyright law.' 37
Indeed, even before the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed, the U.S,
Supreme Court recognized the uncopyrightability of useful articles. 138
For instance, in 1879, in Bake09 the U.S. Supreme Court set forth the
idea-expression dichotomy, but the Court, in denying copyright protec-
tion for the plaintiff's bookkeeping forms, also relied on the inherent.
usefulness of the forms. 14° The plaintiff's explanation of his bookkeep-
ing system was protected, but the forms in his book were not, because
they conveyed no information and were merely used to practice the art
of bookkeeping. 141 Although Baker is most often cited for the idea-
expression dichotomy, its holding also serves to limit copyright by deny-
ing protection to utilitarian articles, such as blank forms. 142
Moreover, the House Report for the 1976 Copyright Act cites
Mazer v. Stein, 143 among other cases, as holding that a useful article is
something that has an intrinsic utilitarian function apart from convey-
ing information or portraying an appearance.'" Basically, copyright
132 17	 § 102(a) (5).
iss	 § 101,
134 Id.
135 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5668.
138 See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1148-49; Gay 'flys. 703 F.2d at 973.
137 See Bmndir, 834 F.2d at 1145, 1147; Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973.
Ma See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249; Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
138 See supra notes 100-110 and accompany text
140 See 101 U.S. at 104-05.
141 Id.
142 See id. at 107.
143 See supra note 100.
144 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54-55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5667-68.
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protection does not stern from an article's apparent artistic worth—
instead, one must determine whether the article is intrinsically func-
tional.'" Unfortunately, the House Report does not specify which uses
are intrinsically functional.'" Accordingly, the judicial system has
worked to define this standard over the years." 7
a. Gay Toys, Inc. v Buddy L Corp.: A Useful Article Possesses an Intrinsic
Function Other Than the Portrayal of the Art or Item Itself
In 1981, in Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals helped define the meaning of "intrinsic" function in hold-
ing that toy airplanes, though useful in a' general sense, were still
copyright. protected." 8 In Gay Toys, the manufacturer of the "Air
Coupe" toy airplane, Buddy L Corporation, sought to enforce its
copyright on its toy airplanes against another toy manufacturer, Gay
Toys, Inc.' 49 Gay Toys conceded that its product design team exam-
ined and referred to Buddy L Corporation's "Air Coupe" in designing
its "Flying Eagle I."150 Subsequently, Buddy L notified Gay Toys that it
was violating Buddy L's copyright in its toy airplane.' 51 Gay Toys
sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate Buddy L's copyright, and
Buddy L counterclaimed for copyright infringement. 152
The district court invalidated Buddy L's copyright in the "Air
Coupe," but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed.' 53 In revers-
ing the district court's decision, the Sixth Circuit noted that the statu-
tory requirement of a useful article is that it has an "intrinsic utilitar-
ian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the
article."154 The Sixth Circuit held that a toy airplane has no intrinsic
utilitarian function other than to portray a real airplane.' 55
145 See id.
146 See Id.
147 See Brandi,: 834 F.2d at 1147; Gay Toys, 703 F.2(1 at 973.
148 703 F.2d at 973-74.
149 /d. at 971.
15a Id.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 971-72.
1" Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 974. The district court found that toy airplanes were useful be-
cause "children need toys for growing tip." Id. at 973. In addition, the district court held
that toy airplanes have the utilitarian function of permitting a "child to dream and to let
his or her imagination soar." Id. quoting Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F.
Stipp. 622,625 (E.D. Mich. 1981)).
154 Id. at 973.
155 Id.
20041	 The Copyrightability of Legal Complaints	 723
The court cited legislative history to illustrate that Congress in-
tended to deny copyright protection to industrial products, such as
televisions and automobiles. 15° The court held that a toy airplane's
function is closer to that of a work of art—a painting of an airplane
that is looked at and enjoyed—than the intrinsic utilitarian functions
of industrial products.'" Essentially, toys do not have "an intrinsic
function other than the portrayal of the real item," and therefore,
they are protected by copyright because they are not useful articles. 158
b. Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.: Concep-
tual Separability—When the Aesthetic and Functional Elements of a Work
Are Separable
In contrast, in 1987, in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific
Lumber Co., the Second Circuit. Court of Appeals applied the useful
article doctrine to the plaintiff's bicycle rack, the "RIBBON Rack,"
and held it uncoppightable because it was designed to serve a purely
utilitarian function—to hold bicycles in place.' 59 The plaintiff, the
original designer, stied the defendant after discovering that it was sell-
ing a product similar to the RIBBON Rack. 16° The Court of Appeals
held that the defendant did not violate any protectable expression by
copying the RIBBON Rack, because the plaintiff designed the rack for
purely utilitarian purposes.m The plaintiff did not simply adopt the
original wire sculpture that gave rise to the bicycle rack idea.'° 2 In-
stead, the design of the RIBBON Rack was essentially a product of in-
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 974.
159 834 F.2d at 1147. The plaintiff's chief owner, the original designer of the RIBBON
Rack, testified that he had created several wire sculptures as part of his personal expres-
sion—one of a bicycle and another self-standing sculpture. Id. at 1146. Ile stated that he
did not give any thought to the utilitarian aspect of the latter wire sculpture until he acci-
dentally juxtaposed the wire bicycle with it. Id. Even so, he did not seriously consider pur-
suing the utilitarian application of his wire sculpture until his friend, a bicycle enthusiast.
informed him that the sculpture would make an excellent bicycle rack. Id. Thereafter, he
worked with his friend to perfect the design of the bicycle rack, and in September 1979,
the Brandir RIBBON Rack was advertised and promoted for sale nationally. Id. This rack,
ubiquitous today, essentially consists of an Undulating, wave-shaped steel tubing for hold-
ing bicycles. Sec id. at 1147, 1149-50 app.
188 Id. at 1146.
101 Id. at 1147. Utilitarian articles, though uncopyrightable, could be protected tinder
U.S. patent laws so long as the requirements for patentability are met. Sec 35 U.S.C.
§§ 101-103. 112 (2000). See generally Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1,
12-15 (1966).
182 Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1147.
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dustrial design. 163 The altered design features were in furtherance of a
"safe, secure, and maintenance-free system of parking bicycles" in-
stead of a work of art. 164
In deciding this case, the court looked to determine whether the
function of the bicycle rack could be separated from its aesthetic
value—what is referred to as conceptual separability. 165 On the one
hand, the court renewed Judge Jon 0. Newman's dissent in Carol
Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp. and proposed that functional and
aesthetic features are conceptually separable if "the article ... stirmt-
lite[s] in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from
the concept evoked by its utilitarian function." 66 On the other hand,
the court discussed a leading scholar on useful articles, Robert Deni-
cola, who views conceptual separability as the relationship between
the design process and the actual work-product. 167 Under Den icola's
test, a work is not copyrightable if its design elements reflect a merger
of aesthetic and functional considerations.m Conversely, conceptual
separability does exist if and when a designer exercises artistic judg-
ment to include certain artistic aspects that are unrelated to the func-
tional elements of the work. 169
The court. followed Professor Denicola's test of conceptual sepa-
rability in holding that the artistic aspects of the RIBBON Rack were
not conceptually separable from its utilitarian aspects.'" The RIBBON
Rack possessed no artistic elements that could be identified as sepa-
rate and "capable of existing independently, of, the utilitarian aspects
of the article," and accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs copyright
in fringenient
1" Id.
164 Id. at 1147.
' 65 Id. at 1143-45.
164 Id. at 1144 (quoting Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 911, 422
(2d Cir. 1985)).
167 Brandin 834 F.2d at 1145; see Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A
Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 741 (1983).
168
 Brandin 834 F.2d at 1145.
169 See id.
170 Id. at 1145, 1147; see Denicola, supra note 167, at 741 (stating that copyrightability
"ultimately should depend on the extent to which the work reflects artistic expression
uninhibited by functional considerations").
171 Brandin, 834 F.2d at 1147-0.
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4. Fair Use Defense
Assuming that a work is copyrightable despite the limitations of
the idea-expression dichotomy, or the merger and useful article doc-
trines, a defendant may still be allowed to copy a copyrighted work by
utilizing the fair use defense. 172 Fair use was codified in the Copyright
Act to reflect the common-law doctrine that others are entitled to use
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without an author's
consent.'" Although fair use is one of the most difficult doctrines to
apply in copyright law, it remains a strong and valid defense for a de-
fendant who, under ordinary circumstances, has copied, and thus, has
infringed, another's copyrighted work." 4 In determining whether a
work qualifies as fair use of a copyrighted work, a court examines the
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work,
the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole, and the effect of the use upon the po-
tential market for or value of the copyrighted work.'" Thus, in the
hypothetical presented in this Note, even if Firm Ks complaint.
qualifies as copyrightable subject matter, Firm Y may have a fair use
defense for copying if Firm Y can show that it used Firm X's com-
plaint in a reasonable manner in accordance with the four fair use
factors.'"
a. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises: The Four Ele-
ments of Fair Use
In 1985, in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant's use of the plaintiff's
work was too extreme to qualify as a fair use." 7 In Harper & Row, the
' 72 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d
at 72-73.
173 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("IT] he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism. comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright");
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 72; 4 Nnummt & NIAIMER, supra.
note 1, § 13.05.
174 See limper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 72-73; see also Dellar
v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 66I, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (describing the fair use doctrine
as the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright").
175
 See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-61; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 72; 4
NuvistER & NuAm ER, supra note 1, § 13.05 [A].
176 See infra notes 284-317 and accompanying text.
177 471 U.S. at 569.
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plaintiff agreed to publish Gerald Ford's memoirs in A Time to Heal:
The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford. 178 Time Magazine agreed to pur-
chase from the plaintiffs the exclusive right to print prepublication
excerpts in its magazine one week prior to shipment of the full-length
book version to bookstores."9
 Before Time Magazine was able to print
the excerpts, however, the defendant received a copy of the unpub-
lished manuscript of A Time to Heal and published excerpts in its own
magazine—attempting to "scoop" Time Magazine's article on the same
subjectiss As a result of the defendant's actions, Time Magazine can-
celed its piece and refused to pay the plaintiff's'
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant infringed its copyright,
and the defendant raised the fair use defense." 2 The Court examined
the four elements of fair use and concluded that the defendant's ex-
ploitation of the unpublished book did not qualify as a fair use of the
plaintiffs copyrighted materia1. 183 First, the Court found that the pur-
pose and character of the use was not only for commercial profit; it also
exploited the copyrighted material without paying the customary
price. 184 The defendant's intended purpose was to trump the copyright
holder's commercially valuable right of first publication, which nullifies
any claim of good faith or fair dealing."5 Second, although the Court
noted that the nature of the copyrighted work was factual and acknowl-
edged the need to disseminate facts, the defendant did not merely copy
factual information."8 The defendant also excerpted subjective de-
scriptions and portraits, and such copying of the plaintiffs individual-
ized expression exceeded the necessity to disseminate facts, which
helped persuade the Court to reject the fair use thin -0 87
Third, the Court examined the amount and substantiality of the
portion used from the plaintiffs work. 188 The defendant only copied
an insubstantial portion of the book."9
 Nevertheless, the Court
agreed with the district court's finding that the excerpts copied were
' 78 Id. at 542.
178 Id. at 542-43.
'8° Id.
181 Id. at 542.
182 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 544.
188 See id. at 560-69.
184 Id. at 561-62.
188 Id. at 562.
188 Id. at 563-64.
187 See Hatpei & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64.
188 Id. at 564-65.
189 Id. at 564.
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"essentially the heart of the book" because they were "the most inter-
esting and moving parts" of the entire work. 19°
Finally, the fourth factor the Court considered was the effect of
the defendant's copying on the market. 191 As the single most impor-
tant element of fair use, the Court held that, Time Magazine's cancella-
tion of the project and its refusal to pay the remaining balance were
caused directly by the defendant's infringement. 192 The defendant was
directly competing for a share of the market when it copied excerpts
from the book, and allowing such a broad allowance of fair use would
pose substantial damage to the marketability of first publication rights
in genera1. 193 Thus, the Court concluded that the defendant's actions
did not constitute a fair use of the plaintiff's book because the copy-
righted material was not used in areasonable manner. 191
b. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v Comline Business Data, Inc.: Infring-
ing Works Must Be Sufficiently Transformative to Qualify as Fair Use
Similarly, in 1999, in Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business
Data, Inc., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decided that copying
news reports to construct abstracts did not qualify as fair use because
the new work was not sufficiently transformative. 195 The court first ad-
dressed the copyrightability of the news reports and found that there
was original expression in the plaintiff's reports apart from the un-
copyrightable facts that it was reporting. 196 The court then addressed
whether the defendants' abstracts qualified as a fair use of die plain-
tiffs articles by examining the four fair use factors. 197
First, the court held that the purpose and character test requires
that the new work "adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning or
message." 198 This inquiry, requires that the copying be substantially
transformative.t 99 In Nihon Keizai, however, the defendants' abstracts
were "not in the least `transfouriative" because the defendants did
19° Id. at 565.
191 Id. at 566-67.
I" Haider &Row, 471 U.S. at 567.
193 Id. at 568-69.
194 See id. at 569,
195 166 F.3d at 72-73.
196 Id. at 70-71; see supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
197 Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3c1 at 72.
199 Id. (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,579 (1994)).
1991d.
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not add anything new in their works—they simply copied and trans-
lated the plaintiffs reports without adding anything original. 2°°
Therefore, the purpose and character of the use weighed against a
finding of fair use. 2°1
Second, in determining the nature of the plaintiffs copyrighted
news reports, the court agreed with the district court's finding that
the plaintiff's articles were creative and original. 2°2 The court recog-
nized, however, that some copyrighted works are "closer to the core of
intended copyright protection than others."203 For instance, factual
news articles, like the plaintiff's reports, are further from "the core"
than more artistic, fictional works of art."4 The court also held that
the expressive elements in the plaintiffs news reports, as opposed to
the factual elements, were not the dominant features of the works. 205
Overall, the court found that this factor was mostly neutral on the
question of fair tise. 2°6
Third, in examining the amount and substantiality of the por-
tions used in relation to the plaintiffs copyrighted works, the court
held that the defendants' abstracts copied "the crucial facts and ideas"
from the plaintiffs reports.207 The defendants' case for fair use, how-
ever, would have been stronger if they merely copied the factual con-
tent from the plaintiff's reports. 208 Instead, the defendants also copied
the plaintiff's copyrighted expression in structure, word choice, and
factual arrangement. 209 Accordingly, the amount of copying of pro-
tectable expression also weighed against a finding of fair use. 210
Finally, in determining the effect of the use upon the potential
market for the comighted work, the court considered not only the
harm caused by the defendants, but also whether similar widespread
conduct would have a substantial impact on the market for the origi-
nal. 2 " This factor also worked against a finding of fair use because as
200 Id.
 (quoting Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Coinline Bus. Data, Inc., No 98 Civ. 641
DLC, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6806, at *39 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 14, 1998)).
201 Id,
2°2 Nihon Keizni, 166 F.3d at 72-73.
203 Id. at 72 (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586).
204 Id.; see also Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990) (holding that 'fair use is
more likely to be found in factual works than in fictional works").
205
 Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 72.
2°6 Id. at 73.
2°7 Id.
208 See id.
209 Id. at 71, 73.
21 ° Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73.
211 Id.
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copies of the plaintiff's work, the defendants' abstracts competed with
and superseded the plaintiff's articles. 212 In conclusion, the court de-
nied the defendants' fair use claim because the copyrighted material
was not used in a reasonable manner—the defendants' abstracts were
insufficiently transformative, copied too much of the plaintiff's ex-
pression, and unfairly competed with the plaintiff's reports. 213
II. COPYRIGHTABILITY OF COMPLAINTS
A. Firm X 's Complaint
Returning to the hypothetical in the Introduction of this NOte,
the threshold issue is whether Firth X's complaint is an original work
of authorship. 214 Before venturing into the analysis, however, several
basic facts about Firm X's class action complaint must be assumed. 215
A legal complaint must state the nature of the action, such as a federal
securities class action suit. 210 Next, the complaint must set forth the
respective parties and the basis for the court's jurisdiction and
venue.2 " With respect. to Firm X's complaint, the main focus is on the
allegations—often included in a "facts" section which, ideally, help
suggest to opposing counsel that the plaintiff's case is strong.203 In the
statement of facts, attorneys for Firm X presumably set forth their
cause of action in the light most favorable to their clients, emphasiz-
ing favorable facts and minimizing the importance of other, less fa-
vorable facts—all in hopes that the facts are sufficient to constitute a
cause or causes of action.219 With these assumptions in place, the in-
quiry shifts to whether Firm X's complaint is copyrightable subject.
matter—specifically, whether Firm X's complaint depicts the requisite
"originality" tinder the Copyright Act so that Firm Y is precluded from
copying the compfaint.220
212 Id.
213 See id.
214 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000); Feist Pubrns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499
U.S. 340, 362-64 (1991); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250-51
(1903); Burrow.Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884); Nihon Keizai
Shinabun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 70-71 (2c1 Cir. 1999).
213 Sec FRANK E. COOPER, WRITING IN Lim PRAortcE 185 (rev. ed. 1963).
216 Id.
217 See id. at 183-84.
218 See td. at 185.
210 Sce id.
220 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000); Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-64; Blcistein, 188 U.S. at 250-51;
Burrow-Giles. 111 U.S. at 59-60; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70-71. To avoid confusion over the
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B. Complaints Are Original
Firm X's copyright in its class action complaint is copyrightable
because it is an "original workil of authorship fixed in a[] tangible
medium of expression" that can be "perceived, reproduced, or other-
wise commtinicated."221 First, the complaint is "fixed in a[] tangible
medium of expression" because it is in written form. 222 In Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 223 and Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing co.224
the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether photographs
and chromolithographs, respectively, were encompassed in the "writ-
ings" that the Constitution was meant to protect. 225 The Court in both .
cases held that the Constitution's language encompassed "all forms of
writing," including printing, engravings, and other means by which
authors' ideas are given "visible expression. "226 By having the complaint
in written and printed forms, Firm X's attorneys have expressed their
case in a visible fornut, thus satisfying the requirement of being "fixed
in a[] tangible medium of expression." 227
Aside from requiring works to meet the fixation requirement, the
Copyright Act also requires that copyright protection only extend to
"original works of authorship." 228
 Firm X's complaint satisfies the
originality standard because the complaint features at least a modi-
cum of creativity.22° For instance, Firm X's complaint, like the photo-
graph of Oscar Wilde in Burrow-Giles, exhibits the author's creative
efforts in choosing sentence structure, factual interpretation, and
word choice.23° The attorney who writes a complaint, like the photog-
rapher in Burrow-Giles who exhibited his creativity by posing Oscar
copying and misappropriation requirements in the Copyright Act, the hypothetical in this
Note assumes that Finn Y copies Firm X's complaint in its totality. Sec 17 U.S.C. § 501. This
Note focuses primarily on whether a legal complaint is copyrightable—not on what consti-
tutes copyright infringement. See infra notes 221-317 and accompanying text.
221 See 17 U.S.C.§ 102(a); Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-64; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250-51; Burrow-
Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70-71.
2" Sec 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Burroto-Giles, 111 U.S. at 56-58; su-
pra note 23 and accompanying text.
223 See Burrow-Giles, II 1 U.S. at 56-57; supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text.
"4 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249; supra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.
225 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra notes 37-56.
220 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Burrow-Giles. 111 U.S. at 58.
227 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Bleistcin, 188 U.S. at 250; Burrow-Giles,111U.S. at 58.
228 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a); Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-64; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Burrow.
Giles, 111 U.S. at 59-60; Nihon Kcizaj, 166 F.3t1 at 70-71.
229 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 362; Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60; Nihon
166 F.3d at 70-71.
^30 See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 60.
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Wilde, choosing an appropriate costume, and applying different light
and shade, utilizes at least a minimal degree of creativity in selecting
which facts to emphasize and even which words to use to emphasize
the respective facts."'
Similarly, in Bleistein, the plaintiffs circus posters were also origi-
nal because they depicted the unique personality of the artist, regard-
less of whether the Court believed in their aesthetic merit. 232 Moreo-
ver, the attorney drafting Firm X's complaint need not be as artistic as
the circus poster designer in Bleistein, because originality is not de-
termined by aesthetic merit. 233 Additionally; Firm Ks complaint also
depicts the author's unique personality because it encompasses the
author's creative choice of words and sentence structure Therefore,
under the Bleistein and But-tyro-Giles standards, Firm Ks complaint is
copyrightable subject matter because it is sufficiently original.23'
Additionally, Firm Ks complaint is also copyrightable subject
matter under the Feist PublicationS v. Rural Telephone Service, Co. 236 and
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, In C. 237 standards.238
Facts, such those enumerated in a legal complaint, are generally un-
copyrightable, but a compilation of facts is copyrightable so long as
there is some modicum of creativity, such as an original selection or
arrangement of facts. 239 Unlike the telephone directory in Feist, which
displayed an entirely typical selection and arrangement of telephone
numbers, an attorney drafting Firm Ks complaint likely considers the
facts necessary to prove the client's claim, and accordingly, arranges
and chooses the facts to express the claim in a light most favorable to
the client. 240 Thus, as suggested by the Court in Feist, the attorney's
creativity in selecting and arranging the facts in the complaint should
be found sufficiently original to warrant copyright pro tection. 241
Moreover, Firm X's complaint is similar to the plaintiff's news re-
port in Nihon Keizai because both works express factual information in
231
 See id.
232
	
Bleistcin, 188 U.S at 251-52.
233
 Sec id.
234 See id. at 250.
235 See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250-51; !harm-Giles. 111 U.S. at 60.
2311 See 499 U.S. at 363-64; supra notes 57-78 and accompanying text.
237 Sec 166 F.3d at 70-71; supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
238 See supra notes 57-87 and accompanying text.
2" See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348, 361-63; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70; Conley. supra note 2.
21°
 See Feist, 499 U.S. at 348,362-64.
241
 See id. at 362-64.
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a creatively expressive manner. 242 Like the news reports in Nihon
Keizai, an attorney's arrangement of facts, word choice, sentence
structure, and analysis are all forms of protectable expression.245 Firm
Y would be infringing on Firm X's copyright by copying Firm X's
complaint, because Firm Y would be copying someone else's interpre-
tation of events, choice of words, and factual emphasis. 244 Despite the
rule that facts are not copyrightable, Firm X's complaint is copy-
rightable because it encompasses protected expression in the form of
word choice and arrangement, sentence structure, and claim analy-
sis.245 Essentially, Firm X does not have a copyright over the factual
events that occurred in its client's case—that is, Firm Y may freely
copy facts—but Firm X does have a copyright in its expression and
interpretation of those facts. 246
C. Idea-Expression Dichotomy: Complaints Do Not Express an Idea
The idea-expression dichotomy also does not limit Firm X's copy-
right in its complaint because the complaint does not express an
"idea."247
 Unlike the plaintiff's attempt to copyright the art of book-
keeping in Baker v. Selden, 248 Firm X does not want to copyright the art
or method of drafting complaints. 249 Indeed, Firm X merely wants to
protect its creation of a specific complaint, drafted for a specific client,
for a specific cause of action. 25° Moreover, Finn X is not copyrighting
its specific cause of action. 251 Consistent with Judge Hand's decision in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Cotp.,252
 Finn X is not copyrighting a -gen-
eral idea" in complaints—instead, it is copyrighting the specific aspects
of its complaint, such as the factual interpretation of how its client will
prevail at trial. 253 Copyrighting Firm X's complaint does not preclude
all others from practicing the art of drafting complaints—importantly,
242 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70-71; Conley, supra note 2.
243 Sec Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70-71; Conley, supra note 2.
244
 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70-71.
245 See id.; Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-64.
246 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70-71.
247 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000); Baker v. Seidel]. 101 U.S. 99,102 (1879); Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,121 (2d Cir. 1930).
245 See Bakei; .101 U.S. at 107; supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
249 See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text.
250 See COOPER, supra note 215, at 185.
2" See SUPIT1 notes 214-220 and accompanying text.
252 See Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121-22; supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
258 See supra notes 111-117 and accompanying text.
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another firm, such as Firm Y, is still free to draft a complaint for the
same case so long as its complaint is sufficiently original. 254
If anything, Firm X's complaint embodies the idea that its client
should prevail in a cause of action, and Firm X's complaint is merely
an expression of this idea.255 Other firms are free to express the idea
in their own creative and original manner, because Firm X is claiming
rights to the complaint's expressive content only, not its idea or its
facts. 256
D. Merger.: There Are More Than a Limited Number of Ways
to Write a Complaint
In addition, Firm X's complaint is not precluded from copyright
protection under the merger doctrine because there are more than a
limited number of ways to express the content and idea of the com-
plaint.257 Unlike "Rule 1" in Morrissey v. Proctor &' Gamble Co., 258 which
could be expressed only in a limited number of ways, a complaint
drafted for a specific cause of action can be organized and expressed
in more than a "mere handful" of ways. 259 The subject matter embod-
ied in a complaint is not as straightforward and simple as a sweep-
stakes contest rule that instructs entrants on how to enter a con test. 26°
In drafting a complaint, an attorney must organize and present
the facts of a case in an understandable and brief' fashion. 26i An attor-
ney chooses specific words—emotive or neutral—to present the case
in the most favorable way possible. 262 This thought-provoking and
time-consuming process likely does not produce only a handful of
ways to draft a complaint. 263 Although it is likely that skilled attorneys
will focus on similar facts, they likely will not express them in the ex-
act same manner, with the exact same adjectives, or in the exact same
order. 264 Moreover, though brevity and precision are basic tenets of
complaint writing, adherence to these rules need not deprive a corn-
254 Sec Feist, 499 U.S. at 362-64; Bicistein, 188 U.S. at 250; Brirmio-Gi les. 111 U.S. at 60;
Baker, 101 U.S. at 105; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70-71,
255 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 105.
2" See id.; Nichols, 45 F.2(1 at 121.
257 See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675.678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
258 See id. at 678; supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
260 Sec id. at 678-79.
261 Sec COOPER, supra note 215, at 185-86.
262 See id. at 185.
263 See id, at 185-86.
264 Sec id. at 185-86,187-88.
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plaint of vigor or uniqueness—it may very well add to the complaint's
presentation and dramatic impact. 265 Indeed, part of the drafting at-
torney's task is to predict opposing counsel's reaction to the com-
plaint, and in doing so, make crucial "artistic" decisions regarding the
presentation of the complaint. 206 Accordingly, Firm X's complaint is
not similar to "Rule 1" in Morrissey, because the idea of the com-
plaint—that the client deserves relief—can be expressed in numerous
ways depending on the attorney interpreting the case, the relief
sought, and the claims alleged.267 Firm X's complaint does not fore-
close other methods of expressing the same idea of seeking relief for
the client, and accordingly, the merger doctrine does not limit Firm
X's copyright in its complaint. 268
E. Useful Article Doctrine: Legal Complaints Are Not Useful Articles
In addition, the useful article doctrine does not limit copyright
protection for Firm X's complaint because it is unlikely that a legal
complaint. serves "an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to
portray the appearance of the article or to convey information."269
Therefore, in determining whether complaints are useful articles, the
question is whether legal complaints have an intrinsic utilitarian func-
tion apart from conveying information 270
The toy airplanes in Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L colp.,271 though useful
for upbringing children, were not viewed as possessing an intrinsic utili-
tarian function because their main purpose was to portray the appear-
ance of an article—namely, an airplane.272 The toy airplanes in dispute
in Gay Toys did not have a utilitarian function other than portraying air-
planes, and accordingly, the useful article doctrine was not applicable. 2"
In contrast, a legal complaint is used to convey information about the
parties to a lawsuit, the claims alleged, and the factual circumstances of
the allegations.274 This function, in itself, is useful, but the test is
265 See id. at 187.
266 See COOP ER, supra note 215, at 188.
267 Sce Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678-79; COOPER, supra note 215, at 187.
268
 See Morrissey, 379 F.2d at 678-79.
266
 See 17 U S.C.§ 101 (2000); Brandir Intl, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d
1142,1147-48 (2d Cir. 1987); Gay Toys. Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970,973 (fith Cir.
1983).
270
	 Brandir; 834 F.2d at 1147-48; Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973.
271 See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973; supra notes 148-158 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 148-158 and accompanying text.
273 Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 974.
27' See COOPER, Sttpra note 215, at 185-86.
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whether the complaint serves an intrinsic function other than conveying
the lawsuit's information. 275 A legal complaint, like the toy airplane,
does not serve any purpose other than to convey information. 270
Moreover, Firm Ks complaint, unlike the RIBBON Rack in
Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 277 is not a useful
article because the functional and aesthetic elements of a legal com-
plaint, unlike those of a bike rack, are conceptually separable. 278
Brandir, the designer of the bicycle rack did not include any artistic
elements independent of the function of the bicycle rack, and there-
fore, there was no conceptual separability and the useful article doc-
trine applied.279 Firm X's attorney does not draft a complaint for the
sole purpose of reporting facts—indeed, attorneys write to express
and to persuade that their claims should prevai1, 280 Additionally, the
artistic elements of a legal complaint—the author's expression, sen-
tence structure, and factual analysis—are distinguishable from the
functional, informative aspects of a complaint. 281 In other words, the
artistic elements of persuasion in an attorney's word choice, sentence
structure, and analysis in a complaint are capable of existing inde-
pendently from the utilitarian aspects of the article, which consist
mostly of facts. 282 Therefore, an article's ability to convey factual in-
formation does not automatically make it a "useful article" with lim-
ited copyright protection
278 See Brandin 834 F.2d at 1147-48; Gay Toys, 703 F2d at 973.
278 See Bmndin 834 F.2d at 1147-48; Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 974.
272 See Bra rutin 834 F.2d at 1147-48; supra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
278 See supra notes 159-171 and accompanying text.
278 Brandin 834 F.2d at 1147-48.
288 See CoopER, supra note 215, at 185-86.
283 See id. at 187; Conley, supra note 2.
282 See Bmndir, 834 F.2d at 1147-48.
283 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70; Gay Toys. 703 F.2d at 973. Usefulness, in itself, does
not invalidate copyright protection automatically. See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70; Brandir
834 F.2d at 1147. One must determine whether there are artistic qualities about the work
that are worthy of copyright protection, because disallowing copyright protection on a
work merely because it is useful in a general sense would effectively invalidate copyrights
on many articles that convey factual information—such as news reports, newspapers, and
other non-fictional works. See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 70; Brandir 834 F.2d at 1147. More.
over, denying copyright protection to news reports and other non-fictional works would
have the detrimental effect of reducing authors' and artists' incentives to create such
works. See CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256,1262 (9th Ci•. 1999) (holding that extending
copyright protection to a publisher of price guides furthered competition by allowing the
publisher's competitors to create their own price guides, and simultaneously, provided an
incentive to the publisher to create such guides).
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F. Fair Use: Verbatim Copying of Another Complaint Is Not Fair Use
Firm Ywill be unable to plead the fair use defense effectively re-
garding its copying of Firm X's complaint because it is not using Firm
X's copyrighted material in a reasonable manner; in other words,
none of the four elements of fair use works in Firm Ys favor. 284 First,
like the copying in both Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises285 and Nihon Keizai, 288 the purpose and character of Firm Ys use
of Firm X's complaint is not fair use because it is for commercial
profit and is not substantially transformative. 287 In 1985, in Harper &
Row, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant's actions—
copying material excerpts out of a book—were not fair use because its
intended purpose was to trump the copyright holder's right of first
publication.288 Technically, Firm 1' is unable to "trump" Firm X's com-
plaint because Firm X's complaint is already available and in
existence. 289
 Firm Y can, however, entice and lure other class action
clients to utilize its services by, for instance, charging lower legal fees
due to an already-existing complaint. 299 The complaint, however, is
solely Firm X's work product, and Firm Y's copying would compete
unfairly with Firm X 291 Denying Firm X copyright protection for its
complaint would hinder competition, because no law firm would have
an incentive to be the "first" to write a complaint knowing other law
firms may subsequently copy its complaint for use in the same case. 292
Therefore, extending copyright to the complaint and denying Firm
Y's fair use claim would provide an incentive for law firms to accept
cases actively, and to draft complaints with the confidence that com-
peting firms will not usurp their efforts. 293
284 See 17 U.S.C.§ 107 (2000); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471
U.S. 539,560-69 (1985); Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3(1 at 72-73.
285 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561-69; supra notes 177-194 and accompanying text.
288
 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3(1 at 72-73; supra notes 195-213 and accompanying text.
287 See supra notes 177-213 and accompanying text.
288 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562-63.
289 See id.
299 See id.; Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley, supra note 2.
291 See Harper & Row. 471 U.S. at 562-63, 566-69; Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley,
supra note 2.
292
 See Harper 419' Row, 471 U.S. at 566-69; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73; see also CDN, 197
F.3d at 1262 (holding that extending copyright protection to a publisher of price guides
furthered competition by allowing the publisher's competitors to create their own price
guides, and simultaneously, provided an incentive to the publisher to create such a guide).
293 See Harper C.9' Row, 471 U.S. at 566-69; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73; Birch, supra note
2, at 257.
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Additionally, the purpose and character of Firm Y's use of Firm
X's complaint is not at all "transformative" as is required in Nihon
Keizai.294 The defendants in Nihon Keizai copied the plaintiff's news re-
ports to sell the reports as abstracts. 295 The defendants did not add any-
thing new or original in their abStracts to "transform" sufficiently the
plaintiff's work.296 Accordingly, Firm Ys verbatim copying of Firm X's
complaint does not meet the sufficiently "transformative" threshold
because Firm Y did not add anything to the complaint—except, per-
haps, its signature and address on the certification page, as well as the
plaintiff's information.297 Therefore, the character and purpose of Finn
Y's copying of Firm X's complaint—verbatim copying that lacks origi-
nality and transformative quality—weighs against a finding of fair
use. 298
The second element of fair use—the nature of the copyrighted
work—also warrants a finding against fair use because Firm X's com-
plaint is original and creative by virtue of the author's choice of
words, sentence structure, and overall organization.299 Firm 1' may
argue that a complaint is fact-based, and therefore, uncopyrightable
because facts are uncopyrightable subject matter. 36° The copyrighted
works in Haler es' Row and Nihon Keizai, however, were also factual
works—an autobiography of Gerald Ford and news reports, respec-
tively—but fair use was denied in both cases." Although fact-based
works may not be as close to the core of intended copyrightable
works, they may still receive protection if expressed with sufficient
originality.302 Essentially, the facts, themselves, may be copied, but the
author's expression is copyright protected. 393 Therefore, Firm Ywould
better off copying only the uncopyrightable facts in Firm X's com-
plaint; verbatim copying of the entire complaint, however—facts and
copyrightable expression—does not support a finding of fair use 3°4
The third element of fair use, the amount and substantiality cop-
ied, is not difficult to evaluate in Firm Y's case because it is assumed
294 See 166F.3dat72.
293 Id. at 69.
298 Id. at 72.
297 See id.; COOPER, supra note 215, at 183-85.
298 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561-63; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 72.
299 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64; Nihon ICeizai, 166 F.3d at 72-73.
3°° See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64; Nihon Kcizai, 166 F.3d at 72-73.
3°1 Sec Harper & Row. 471 U.S. at 542, 569; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 69,73.
302 Sec Hat per & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64; Nihau Keizai. 166 F.3d at 72-73.
303 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 72-73.
304 See Heoper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563-64; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 72-73.
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that Firm Y made a virtually verbatim copy of Firm X's complaint. 306
Accordingly, Firm Y also copied Firm X's word choice, factual ar-
rangement, and other protected expression, which operates against a
finding of fair use. 506
- Finally, the most important factor in determining fair use—the
market effect of Firm Y's copying Firm X's complaint—also works
against a finding of fair use."7 Like the defendant in Ha/per & Row
who copied excerpts of a book in order to "scoop" Time Magazine's
article on the same topic, Firm Y is using Firm X's complaint to
avoid repeating Firm X's hard work and to lure clients through
lower complaint-drafting costs. 308 Firm Y is thus competing for a
share of the market with an unfair advantage—essentially, Firm X
has already completed the work and Finn Y is free-riding off the
completed complaint."9
Moreover, the court in Nihon Keizai not only considered the im-
pact on the market, but also questioned whether widespread conduct
would have a substantial impact on the market for the original
work.31 ° The "market" for legal complaints resides in the overall mar-
ket for legal services, which undoubtedly would be affected if law
firms could copy each other's complaints freely. 311 In the hypothetical
class action lawsuit, no law firm would have the incentive or motiva-
tion to be the first firm to draft a complaint because other law firms
could immediately reproduce the complaint for other clients in the
class.312 This lack of incentive may cause unnecessary delays in filing
lawsuits, and additionally, clients may also sit and wait until a "copy-
able" complaint is produced so that they can seek out a law firm that
can copy the complaint.3 " By doing so, the clients will not have to pay
the corresponding attorney's fees for time spent drafting a complaint
325 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564-66; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73. Copying less
would require a more in-depth evaluation, like the inquiry in Harper & Row, of whether
Firm Ycopied the heart" of the complaint. See 471 U.S. at 565. This issue, however, would
stray from this Note's focus on the copyrightability of complaints and would enter into the
realm of copyright infringement and misappropriation issues. See supra note 26 and ac-
companying text.
366 See Harper & Rare, 471 U.S. at 563-66; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 71,73.
3°2 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-69; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73.
3118 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542, 566-69; Birch, supra note 2, at 256-57; Conley,
supra note 2.
31" See Harper &' Row, 471 U.S. at 566-69; Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley, stipm note 2.
31° Nihon Ktizai, 166 F.3d at 73.
311
 See id.; Birch, supra note 2. at 257; Conley, nom note 2.
312
 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73; Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley, supra note 2.
3 13 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73; Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley, supra note 2.
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because a suitable complaint has already been drafted. 314 Extending
copyright protection to Firm X's complaint ensures competition
among firms, and allows clients to seek legal counsel freely without
wondering whether they should wait for another plaintiff in the class
to act lirst. 31 5 Due to the detrimental market effects that follow from
copying Firm Ks complaint, a court likely would deny Firm Y's fair
use defense.") Overall, the purpose and character of Firm Y's copy-
ing, the nature of Firm X's complaint, the amount and substantiality
copied, and the effect of the use upon the potential market support a
finding against fair use.3"
CONCLUSION
Firm X's legal complaint. easily meets the Copyright Act's origi-
nality requirement. because it reflects a modicum of creativity through
the author's selection and arrangement of facts, expression, and
analysis. Based on copyright case law, firms like Firm X should hold a
valid copyright in their legal complaints, and accordingly, law firms
like Firm Y would be liable for copyright infringement were they to
file virtually identical complaints.
Despite the various limitations to copyrightability, Firm Y would
be unable to succeed in defending its actions against. Firm X by raising
the typical arguments against copyrightability. For instance, legal
complaints do not express ideas so the idea-expression dichotomy as
set forth in Baker v. Selden would not invalidate Firm X's copyright. In
addition, the merger doctrine also would not limit Firm X's copyright
in its complaint because, unlike the contest rule in Morrissey v. Procter
&' Gamble Co., there are likely more than a limited number of ways to
express the ideas within a legal complaint. Moreover, unlike the bicy-
cle rack in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., the
useful article doctrine also would not apply against Firm X because a
legal complaint does not serve a utilitarian function other than con-
veying information.
Finally; Firm Y could not successfully plead the fair use defense
for its copying because the type of verbatim copying of another firm's
314 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73; Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley, supra note 2.
515 See Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73; Birch, supra note 2, at 257; Conley, supra note 2.
318 See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566-69; Nihon Keizai, 166 F.3d at 73.
317 Sec Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69; Nihon licizai, 166 F.3d at 72-73. Perhaps it
would be fair use for Firm Y to make a copy of Finn X's complaint purely for its files so
that it has documentation on the approaches that other plaintiffs are taking. See supra note
173 and accompanying text.
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complaint discussed herein is not fair use based on the four factors
enunciated in Haider & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises and
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc.: the purpose
and character of the infringing use; the nature of the copyrighted
work; the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Thus, Firm X
possesses a valid copyright in its legal complaint such that other firms,
like Firm Y, are precluded from copying.
LISA P. WANG
